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Preface
The Asian Crisis in 1997 affected almost everyone in Korea. Thousands of companies went out of business, and many workers lost their jobs. Foreign investors fled the country, major banks became insolvent, and the government depleted its foreign reserves as the country went bankrupt. This crisis was financially and emotionally painful for me. I had returned to Korea in 1994. At that time, Korea's prospects looked bright. Korean firms continued to grow at a phenomenal rate and had expanded aggressively overseas. Every Korean I met was proud of his country, and businessmen were confident that Korea would soon catch up to Japan, which had served as a role model for Korea. On the other hand, chaebols were the subject of fear, disdain, and resentment. They were blamed for devouring Korea's resources and squeezing out smaller companies. Newspapers reported many incidents of chaebols making illegal contributions to politicians and receiving favors in return. Foreign governments often charged chaebols with dumping and other unfair business practices. Western businessmen believed chaebols were analogous to cancer cells that grew without purpose and thereby killed neighboring cells before consuming themselves. As I researched chaebols, I learned that they were neither crazy nor irrational. Rather, chaebols had been efficient given their environment. By sharing financial and intangible resources such as brands, technology, and human resources among affiliates, their internal markets had created enormous synergies. Such resource sharing had been the source of Korean firms' competitive advantage and had enabled Korea's economy to grow quickly. Yet the Asian Crisis revealed chaebols' fatal weaknesses. The resource sharing among legally independent affiliates was possible only because chaebols were centralized, and their chairmen wielded immense power. There was no way to guard against the ill-conceived strategies of these chairmen, who pursued diversification that lacked any economic rationale, cross-subsidized unprofitable affiliates, and diverted profits to affiliates in which they and their families owned large equity stakes. All these activities wasted the synergies Preface xi created through resource sharing. The intricate web of crossshareholding, debt guarantees, and vertical integration further inhibited chaebols' efforts to restructure. During the transition from a state-controlled economy to a market-oriented economy in the years prior to the Asian Crisis, neither the Korean government nor the markets could monitor or guide chaebols' investment activities.
This book argues that wholesale criticisms of chaebols and radical prescriptions for chaebols, such as breaking them up, are wrong. It proposes instead that the Korean government needs to build institutional infrastructures, especially corporate governance systems, which will help markets function better. Other laws that protect minority shareholders' rights and strictly enforce the Fair Trade Act will make practices such as expropriation and cross-subsidization more difficult and will ensure that chaebols' investment decisions are sound. At the same time, increased international competition in their home markets will force chaebols to focus on their core businesses. By revamping its corporate governance system and trade policies, the Korean government can unleash the power of hardworking managers and workers, who were a key factor behind Korea's dramatic economic growth. I have no doubt that when chaebols are reformed, they will once again become strong global players.
As I researched and wrote about chaebols during the last five years, I realized how much I had learned -and continue to learn -from my teachers and colleagues. For this reason, I dedicate this book to them as a way of expressing my deep gratitude. Byung-Hyou Chong of the Seoul National University taught me industrial organization economics in college and encouraged me to pursue graduate work. Edward Bowman, Hubert Gatignon, Bruce Kogut, Dan Levinthal, and Harbir Singh of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania were
